Recent commentary downplaying the U.S. Army’s role in the Indo-Pacific misrepresents the complex security landscape and landpower’s essential place within it.
Assertions that the Army is on a “dead-end ride to Asia” are short-sighted, overlooking how deterrence must function across sea, air, land, space, and cyber domains as was just witnessed in the Middle East with the extraordinary strike in Iran. Likewise, remarks by Air Force Chief of Staff General David Allvin and his so-called strategist—that one service must grow “at the expense of others,” namely the Army—undermine the foundations of the joint force.
In today’s gray-zone competition and looming threat of large-scale war in the Indo-Pacific, adversaries probe seams relentlessly. Such shallow and parochial views are unhelpful, further exposing divisions. Alternatively, a fully joint and integrated force—anchored by land power with transformative capabilities—can hold those seams together. This is because land power underwrites joint operations and binds the region’s security architecture in ways that no other form of power can.
Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific cannot be achieved with exquisite maritime or air systems alone. During my recent testimony to the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, I emphasized how we have invested heavily in sea and air campaigns, while leaving ourselves exposed where conflicts are decided: on land.
The CCP’s primary instrument for coercion is the People’s Liberation Army, relying on its land force—the PLA Army—to achieve a future cross-Strait invasion of Taiwan. The PLA Navy, Rocket Force, and other branches will play important roles in a cross-strait invasion scenario. But if the PLA Army cannot land, cannot maneuver, cannot hold terrain, and cannot subdue the population, then the CCP cannot prevail.
In military terms, this makes China’s ground forces the operational center of gravity—and there can be only one. The very prospect of an attempted landing is deterred by credible joint forces, including forward-positioned ground troops armed with a wide range of transformative capabilities. Reducing the Army’s value to a handful of “core competencies” (air defense, sustainment, command and control) ignores the inherent interdependencies of joint operations, the complexities of modern warfare, and the multidomain environment.
Adm. Samuel Paparo, who leads U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has repeatedly said that “ground-based fires are increasingly valuable force multipliers” as crucial deterrence options. Equally vital, he says, are joint logistics hubs, integrated air and missile defense, resilient communication and targeting networks, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, and regional security partnerships underwritten by the indispensable contributions of Army forces.
Countering China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy demands lower-cost, survivable, mobile, reloadable, long-endurance land-based fires; engineering and logistics to sustain joint campaigns; terrestrial sensors for joint targeting; multiple forms of protection against conventional and strategic attack; multi-echelon command and control; and maneuver forces to secure and defend key terrain. The sum is a visible enduring presence on the ground in the most consequential region against the most consequential threat, as I have expressed before repeatedly.
Critics argue the Army lacks access beyond traditional basing in Northeast Asia. Events on the ground prove otherwise. Since 2021, Army forces have dramatically expanded episodic deployments, live-fire exercises, and prepositioned stocks across Oceania, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. For example, Army units have conducted Patriot live-fire exercises in Palau, Australia, and the Philippines; multinational large-scale maneuvers and joint logistics rehearsals in Australia; improved forward logistic hubs in multiple, distributed locations; and deployed the Typhon anti-ship missile system in the Philippines—drawing condemnation from the Chinese Communist Party.
These expanding footprints underscore that land power in the Indo-Pacific is neither marginal nor static—and, more importantly, presents combat-ready capability for the joint force and our allies and partners. Of note, land forces remain predominant across the region: India, Japan, Korea, Philippine, Australian, and the Taiwan Army plus smaller island militaries. All have joint commands or are in the process of establishing them; while others have combined (i.e. multinational) commands like in Korea.
Collectively, our partner armies—big and small—form a tight knit strategic land power network, the nucleus of America’s hub-and-spoke security architecture in a region lacking collective security agreements. Only by strengthening this network can we achieve the positional advantage necessary to outmaneuver a peer adversary, thereby preventing the catastrophe of war.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has stressed U.S. resolve to uphold its interests in the Indo-Pacific. “We will do this through the deterrent power of the strongest, most effective, most lethal fighting force in the world…supported by—and in partnership with—capable, like-minded allies and partners” he said. From the interior of Australia to the mountains of Japan, and across to the islands of Taiwan and the plains of India, we stand shoulder to shoulder with partners who share our commitment to peace, prosperity, and the rule of law.
Those opposed to freedom and stability likewise field sizable land forces, a fact that our deterrence approach must not overlook. The PLA Army is the largest active force in the world—more than double the size of the U.S. Army’s active component. The Korean People’s Army and Russian Army—both with robust conventional capabilities—are fighting alongside one another in Ukraine. Despite reported missteps, these armies are gaining invaluable battlefield experience in modern interstate warfare—and we should take notice.
Army ground troops bore the blood price in four major Indo-Pacific wars of the last century. Taking in lessons from current conflicts, as well as those from history, the Army is executing its largest transformation in recent memory. Army leaders have an opportunity to dispel short-sighted opinions and counter parochial myths. For the Army Transformation Initiative to deliver the force that can deter and, if necessary, defeat China in war, its leaders must:
1. Articulate a comprehensive strategy that underscores joint interdependencies, warns against single-domain solutions, and expresses the importance of land areas—including our own Pacific homeland.
2. Highlight the power of relationships and training, showing how persistent presence and Army partnerships build access and reinforces treaty commitments.
3. Reclaim our legacy by reminding policymakers, partners, and even American Soldiers of the Army’s enduring sacrifices and contributions over the course of four major wars and decades maintaining peace and stability.
The siren song of a single form of power—air, sea, or land—must be resisted. A secure, stable Indo-Pacific demands the combined capabilities of every service, with an appreciation for the contributions to jointness and coalition-style cooperation that landpower provides. A capable, ready U.S. Army—jointly integrated and partnered with allies—is essential for regional stability and the defense of America’s long-term freedom and prosperity.
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