Braxton Taylor
The U.S. presidential election isn’t drawing eyes only at home; Moscow and Kyiv are watching closely, too. Regardless of who wins in November, there will be significant implications for Ukraine as it continues to resist Russia in a war heading toward a fourth year.
Washington’s continued support is seen by some as no less than an existential issue for Ukraine. Without U.S. arms and aid, it is unlikely that the nation would be able to continue repelling its larger, better-armed neighbor.
During the presidential debate on Sept. 10, 2024, Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and Republican contender Donald Trump had a chance to clarify their positions on Ukraine. Trump evaded ABC moderator David Muir’s question regarding the importance of Ukraine’s victory over Russia, twice. Instead, he repeated his long-standing line that he would achieve a negotiated peace quickly – even before taking office as president.
At the same debate, Harris dismissed the idea of Trump negotiating with “a dictator who would eat you for lunch.” She instead emphasized the Biden policy to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” in concert with U.S. allies.
But detail has been light on what either candidate would actually do to support Ukraine and end the war. So, what do we know about each candidate’s approach to Ukraine based on their records?
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Trump has repeatedly stated that ending the war is in the U.S.’s best interests and that he can end the war quickly. In fact, Trump is certain that had he remained president after the 2020 election, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not have invaded – an unsubstantiated claim he repeated during the Sept. 10 presidential debate.
Trump has often reiterated that both Putin and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy respect him, and he would be able to use his “good relationship” with both to bring them to the negotiating table and end the war.
Yet, Trump’s record on his relationships with Zelenskyy and Putin is rather complicated.
Trump’s admiration for Putin is well documented and dates back to his first presidential run in 2016, sparking numerous investigations and reports of collusion. Most recently, Bob Woodward reported that Trump secretly sent COVID-19 tests to Putin in the midst of a pandemic shortage, a claim confirmed by the Kremlin.
Trump’s relationship with Zelenskyy is similarly laden with baggage. A 2019 phone call between the two men, during which Trump pressured Ukraine’s president to open a criminal investigation into Joe Biden, led to Trump’s impeachment. In exchange, Ukraine would have received continued U.S. support for the country’s defense against Russia, which had been waging a proxy war in eastern regions of Ukraine since 2014. During the subsequent hearings in Congress, one of Trump’s aides testified that “Trump did not give a sh*t about Ukraine” and was only interested in his own political gains.
Standing next to Zelenskyy during a meeting at the Trump Tower on Sept. 27, 2024—their first meeting since Sept. 25, 2019—Trump said he was sure that both Zelenskyy and Putin are interested in peace and that a “very fair” and “rapid” deal is possible.
When asked what that deal might entail, Trump responded that it’s “too early” to discuss details and that both he and Zelenskyy have “their own ideas.”
While the Republican candidate has not been explicit on the details of negotiations or possible conditions, some of his proxies have voiced proposals. Trump’s vice presidential pick, JD Vance, has laid out a plan that includes potential land concessions on the part of Ukraine and the creation of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines of the Russian-occupied territory of eastern Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Trump’s son Donald Jr. co-authored a piece with former presidential candidate-turned-Trump ally Robert F Kennedy Jr., arguing that a concession to Russian demands for “Ukrainian neutrality and a halt to NATO’s eastward expansion” were reasonable to avoid a nuclear game of chicken. Although these have not been echoed in Trump’s own statements on Ukraine, both men have the ear of the Republican candidate.
These plans have been criticized as closely resembling those of the Kremlin. Before meeting with Trump in New York, Zelenskyy had also criticized Vance’s plan and expressed doubts that Trump and his team really know how to end the war.
Harris has been harshly critical of Trump’s approach to Ukraine. “They are not proposals for peace,” Harris said in response to suggestions that Ukraine cede territory for peace. “Instead they are proposals for surrender,” she added.
Such views are in line with Harris’ record. As part of the Biden administration, Harris has given vocal support to Ukraine’s fight for political sovereignty and territorial integrity.
At the onset of the full-scale invasion in early 2022, Harris traveled to Europe to help shore up a coalition of European allies to support Ukraine.
As vice president, Harris has repeatedly condemned Russian war crimes in Ukraine. In February 2023, while attending the annual Munich Security Conference in Germany, she announced that the U.S. has determined that Russian actions in Ukraine amounted to “crimes against humanity,” affirming U.S. commitment to the international rule of law.
Along with continued support, the U.S. has provided substantial aid for Ukraine, totaling US$61.3 billion in military aid since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.
The Biden administration also has said that rising costs and keeping pressure on Russia through sanctions are important mechanisms to keep Moscow accountable. Harris reiterated this need to maintain sanctions and broad coalition support for Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference in February 2024 and again in June at the peace summit organized by Ukraine in Switzerland.
As a presidential candidate, Harris has openly signaled her commitment to supporting Kyiv—not only for Ukraine’s survival but for the collective security of NATO allies and the U.S. itself. Harris emphasized this point in the September debate, suggesting that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland.”
Standing next to Zelenskyy in Washington on Sept. 26, 2024, Harris reiterated the point: “The United States supports Ukraine not out of charity, but because it’s in our strategic interest.”
Yet, White House policy on Ukraine has been criticized for being slow and hesitant in supplying weaponry. The U.S. has imposed rules on the use of heavy weaponry against targets inside Russia. Furthermore, the U.S. has so far been reticent on Ukraine’s invitation to join NATO, which is seen as crucial for any lasting peace in Kyiv. How Harris’ White House would differ from Biden’s on these issues is not clear.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. Congress has passed five bills that provide aid to Ukraine, totaling US$175 billion.
However, a six-month delay in aid in early 2024 highlighted growing partisan tension in Congress over continued aid to Ukraine.
The composition of Congress after the November election is another unknown factor in Washington’s support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy met with congressional leaders during his visit to the U.S. in September, but notably absent was Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson, who in the past has shown reluctance to support continued funding.
For the large part, support for Ukraine remains bipartisan in Congress and among American voters. Yet there is a risk the election could further politicize the issue. And the outcome of November’s vote could determine whether U.S. efforts focus more on pushing for a negotiated deal or ongoing support for Ukraine.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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