Listen to the article

0:00
0:00

The first Trump-class “battleship” ordered up by the White House could cost as much as $22 billion, and could cut into the Navy’s plans for next-generation destroyers, Congressional researchers said Thursday.

An early analysis by the Congressional Budget Office indicates that the BBG(X) could cost between $15 billion and $22 billion, depending on weight and other decisions, CBO analyst Eric Labs said during a presentation at the Surface Navy Association symposium outside Washington, D.C.

“You’re talking about a lead ship in the range of $18 to $19 billion for the 35,000-ton displacement, north of $20 billion if the displacement ends up being higher,” Labs said.

That would make the BBG(X), which Trump announced in December, one of the most expensive ships in U.S. history—more than the $13 billion aircraft carrier Ford, which came in 30 percent over budget. 

Labs speculated that subsequent Trump-class warships could cost somewhere between $10 billion and $15 billion, depending on the size of the vessels and under ideal labor conditions. In his presentation, he noted that the U.S. shipbuilding workforce, which has not grown since 1990, is too small to handle even the Navy’s current plans.

“There’s a lot of reasons to think that those numbers are not going to be correct. I think it’s a starting point,” Labs said. “There are a number of factors that are going to play in that lead me to conclude that the ship might be more expensive than what I’ve said so far … and there’s reasons to think why they could be less expensive.”

The vessel is pitched as a cornerstone of the president’s “Golden Fleet,” announced after the Navy cancelled its Constellation frigate program in November and subsequent launched a new frigate effort. 

Congressional researchers also wonder what the battleship program means for the Navy’s next-generation guided missile destroyer, or DDG(X), program. Navy officials have suggested that the former will replace the latter: “The battleship took the DDG(X) concept and it’s put that on steroids, under the assumption that the counter-targeting efforts of the Navy will protect it and make it survivable,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said on Wednesday.

But what happens if a future administration cancels a giant warship that many naval experts have called impractical?

“I think it’s worth asking the question if at some point, for some reason, there’s a change of heart on the battleship program a few years from now, then what will be the impact of the time loss on the DDG(X),” Ronald O’Rourke, a naval affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service, said during Thursday’s presentation

The DDG(X) and the Constellation frigate programs have been under heavy scrutiny for inaccurate cost estimates and running behind schedule. To avoid similar pitfalls, O’Rourke said, Congress should also consider whether the starts of both the BBG(X) and the frigate programs have received sufficient analysis—particularly since their announcement caught some service officials off guard.

“It’s at least worth asking the question and understanding whether the program came first and the analysis came later or not,” he said. 



Read the full article here

Share.

29 Comments

  1. Linda Williams on

    I’m curious about the potential implications of the BBG(X) program for the Navy’s relationships with its allies and partners, particularly in terms of its potential to enhance or undermine cooperation and interoperability.

  2. Emma Rodriguez on

    I’m skeptical about the claim that subsequent Trump-class warships could cost between $10 billion and $15 billion, given the historical trends of cost overruns in large-scale naval projects.

  3. The comparison to the $13 billion aircraft carrier Ford, which came in 30 percent over budget, raises questions about the potential for cost overruns in the BBG(X) program.

  4. Lucas Rodriguez on

    It’s worth noting that the BBG(X) is pitched as a cornerstone of the president’s ‘Golden Fleet,’ which could imply a significant commitment to the program’s success.

    • Isabella Thomas on

      But what does this mean for other naval programs and priorities, and how will the Navy balance its resources and commitments?

  5. Linda Z. Thomas on

    I’m curious about the ‘Golden Fleet’ concept and how the BBG(X) fits into the president’s overall naval strategy, particularly with the cancellation of the Constellation frigate program.

    • Patricia Davis on

      The ‘Golden Fleet’ initiative seems ambitious, but it’s unclear how it will address the current issues with the U.S. shipbuilding workforce and the potential impact on other naval programs.

  6. The lead ship’s estimated cost of $18 to $19 billion for a 35,000-ton displacement is a significant investment, and it’s essential to consider the potential returns on this investment.

    • Linda Williams on

      The potential benefits of the BBG(X) program, including its counter-targeting capabilities, must be weighed against the costs and potential risks.

  7. The fact that the BBG(X) program is being developed in conjunction with the ‘Golden Fleet’ initiative suggests a significant commitment to the program’s success and the Navy’s overall strategy.

    • However, it’s essential to consider the potential implications of this initiative for the Navy’s other programs and priorities.

  8. I’m concerned about the potential risks and uncertainties associated with the BBG(X) program, including the potential for cost overruns and delays.

    • Jennifer Johnson on

      It’s crucial to develop robust risk management strategies to mitigate these risks and ensure the program’s success.

  9. The fact that the DDG(X) and Constellation frigate programs have been plagued by inaccurate cost estimates and delays should serve as a warning for the BBG(X) program to avoid similar pitfalls.

  10. Linda Rodriguez on

    The BBG(X) program’s potential impact on the Navy’s next-generation guided missile destroyer program is a critical consideration, particularly in terms of the potential consequences of delays or cancellations.

  11. I’m interested in learning more about the potential benefits and drawbacks of the BBG(X) program, including its potential to enhance the Navy’s capabilities and its potential risks and challenges.

  12. Michael Williams on

    Ronald O’Rourke’s question about the potential impact on the DDG(X) program if the battleship program is cancelled in the future is a crucial one, considering the time and resources already invested.

    • It’s essential to consider the potential consequences of such a significant shift in naval priorities and the effects on the Navy’s overall capabilities.

  13. Lucas X. Jones on

    The BBG(X) program’s potential to cut into the Navy’s plans for next-generation destroyers is a concern, especially if the program experiences significant delays or cost overruns.

  14. The estimated cost of the Trump-class battleship, ranging from $15 billion to $22 billion, is staggering and could significantly impact the Navy’s plans for next-generation destroyers, as mentioned by Congressional researcher Eric Labs.

    • Lucas T. Garcia on

      I agree, the cost is concerning, especially considering the U.S. shipbuilding workforce has not grown since 1990, which could lead to further delays and expenses.

  15. Linda Rodriguez on

    The statement by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle that the battleship program will replace the DDG(X) program is surprising, given the concerns about the former’s practicality and cost.

  16. Isabella H. Jones on

    The comparison between the BBG(X) and the DDG(X) programs is intriguing, particularly in terms of their relative costs and capabilities.

    • Jennifer Y. Martinez on

      It’s essential to consider the trade-offs between these programs and how they align with the Navy’s overall priorities and goals.

  17. The size of the vessels and ideal labor conditions will indeed play a significant role in determining the final cost of the BBG(X) program, as Eric Labs noted.

    • However, the current state of the U.S. shipbuilding workforce suggests that ideal labor conditions may be difficult to achieve.

  18. Isabella Miller on

    I’m curious about the potential implications of the BBG(X) program for the Navy’s overall strategy and capabilities, particularly in terms of its ability to adapt to changing threats and technologies.

  19. Elijah N. Thomas on

    The fact that the U.S. shipbuilding workforce has not grown since 1990 is a significant concern, as it could impact the Navy’s ability to meet its current and future shipbuilding needs.

    • This highlights the need for investments in workforce development and infrastructure to support the Navy’s shipbuilding programs.

Leave A Reply

© 2026 Gun Range Day. All Rights Reserved.